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ABSTRACT 
Measuring the company bond rating is important for the business nowadays. Auditor quality 
is considered an important factor. Therefore, it is important to see the effect of auditor qual-
ity on bond rating. The objective of this research is to investigate the relation between audi-
tor quality characteristics (size, tenure and industry specialist auditors), and bond rating. 
Data used in this research are 1283 years-firm observation during 2000-2010. The results of 
this research find that auditor quality characteristics, auditor size and industry specialist 
auditor has a positive significant affect to bond rating, but auditor tenure not significant. The 
controlled variables as firm size, profitability, coverage, firm age, maturity, and bond size 
and bank debt are factored into firm’s bond rating by credit rating agencies. Overall, our 
result suggests that trough their role of providing information, auditor quality (size and spe-
cialist industry) are important factors for the market participants.  
 
Key words: Auditor Quality, Bond Rating, Role of Auditor Information. 
 
PENGARUH KARAKTERISTIK KUALITAS AUDITOR TERHADAP  
RATING OBLIGASI: PENGUJIAN “INFORMATION ROLE”  
AUDITOR DI INDONESIA 
ABSTRAK 
Pengukuran rating obligasi (bond rating) pada perusahaan sangat penting bagi bisnis saat 
ini. Kualitas auditor dalam hal ini dianggap sebagai faktor penting. Oleh sebab itu, sangat-
lah penting jika kita meneliti pengaruh kualitas auditor pada bond rating perusahaan. 
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh karakteristik kualitas auditor yaitu ukuran, tenor, dan spe-
sialisasi industri auditor terhadap bond rating perusahaan. Data berasal dari 1283 perusa-
haan dengan masa observasi selama periode 2000-2010. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa 
karakteristik auditor, ukuran auditor, dan spesialisi industri auditor memiliki hubungan posi-
tif dan signifikan terhadap bond rating, tetapi tenor auditor tidak. Adapun variabel kontrol 
misalnya, ukuran perusahaan, profitabilitas, coverage, umur perusahaan, kematangan, 
ukuran obligasi, dan hutang bank, merupakan faktor yang berpengaruh pada bond rating 
dengan credit rating agencies. Secara umum, hasil menunjukkan peranan pemberian infor-
masi, kualitas auditor (ukuran dan spesialisasi industri) merupakan faktor penting bagi pe-
laku pasar. 
 
Kata Kunci: Kualitas Auditor, Peringkat Obligasi, Peran Informasi Auditor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is important to see whether auditor quality 
characteristics in connection with the capital 
market participants. In this case, this study 
attempts to investigate the role of the infor-
mation depicted in auditor quality character-
istics. Such characteristics are measured by 
size, and auditor industry specialization 
tenor against the bond ratings. It is clear that 
special bond ratings provide a useful context 
for examining the factors related to the per-
ception of quality auditors. This is because 
bond rating agencies rely heavily on the in-
formation extensively audited financial 
statements for the fundamental analysis of 
the company. 
Standard & Poor's (S & P) requires au-
dited financial statements for the past 5 
years in the process of rating. Furthermore, 
S & P Corporate Ratings Criteria (2003) 
states that "rating required audited data, and 
the rating does not entail auditing company 
financial records" (pp.22). This clearly indi-
cates the dependence of bond rating agency 
analysis to the work of external auditors in 
attesting the reliability report of the corpo-
rate finance.  
In the above condition, information 
about the quality of the auditor is the most 
important for bond rating agencies to pro-
vide an unbiased evaluation of the risk of 
default companies (De Crabtree et al. 2006). 
Therefore, the characteristics of quality audi-
tors in the previous studies generally use a 
proxy size and tenor (e.g. De Angelo 1981; 
Wattz and Zimmerman 1981; Mansi et al. 
2004; St. Pierre & Anderson 1984; Stice 
1991; Carcello and Nagy 2004). The re-
search is related to auditor industry speciali-
zation and quality auditor by Lou and Vas-
vari (2009), Carcelo and Nagy (2009), and 
Li et al. (2009). The argument can be given 
that researchers with knowledge and skills as 
well as the expertise are required. The finan-
cial statements of certain industries owned 
industry specialist auditors are considered 
important for he ability to detect material 
errors or misstatements in the financial 
statements which, in turn, will produce a 
higher quality audit. 
Again, the characteristics of quality 
auditors are analyzed by using a proxy 
measure (size) auditor or Public Accountant 
Offices (KAP), the length of the relationship 
between auditors and their clients (tenor), 
and auditor industry specialization. Accord-
ing to Mansi et al. (2004) both sizes auditor 
(KAP) and tenor auditors are related to the 
role of information and the role of guarantor 
(insurance) from the audit.  
De Angelo (1981) analyzed the relation-
ship between audit quality and size of the 
auditor. He states that the greater the size 
and reputation of the firm, the more reduc-
tion of the incidence of failures. This will 
indicate an audit failure, which in turn has a 
reputation incentive to ensure the quality of 
audit services. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1981) predicted that the Firm offers a 
higher quality audit because of its larger 
ability to monitor. 
 Ebrahim (2001) found a negative rela-
tionship between audit qualities as measured 
by the size of KAP (public accountant of-
fice) and earnings management behavior. 
Research by Francis and Yu (2009) find 
consistent evidence that the larger size of the 
KAP (Big-4) provides higher quality audits. 
In particular, they found evidence that the 
Firm issuing audit reports tend to be going 
concern, while the large audit clients KAP 
(Big-4) tended not to make an aggressive 
earnings management. 
The previous research supports the rela-
tionship between auditors and clients 
(tenor). They provide information on audit 
quality (auditor learning theory). Solomon 
et al. (1999) found that the longer tenor 
auditors will reduce the asymmetry of in-
formation among the auditors and the cli-
ents. Thus, they can lead themselves to a 
better quality of audit. Ebrahim (2001) 
states that the auditor tenor has a positive 
effect on the efficiency of the audit process 
and improve the function of monitoring by 
auditors.  
Geiger and Ragunandan (2002) found 
that the asymmetry of information between 
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the auditors and clients is high in the first 
year of assignment. Ghosh and Moon 
(2002), Johnson et al. (2002), Myers et al. 
(2003) found evidence that if tenor in-
creases the earnings management through 
accrual discretionary, it will drop items. 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) the found that 
fraud of financial reporting is more likely to 
occur when the auditor tenor is less than 3 
years. 
 The results of the research by Solomon 
et al. (1999) and Hogan and Jeter (1999) 
suggest that auditors who specialize in a 
particular industry are generally associated 
with higher audit quality (auditor expertise 
supporting the hypothesis). Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) found that auditor industry 
specialization is associated with better cor-
porate disclosure, as measured by the 
evaluation of the quality of disclosure by 
analysts.  
Thus, even though Palmrose (1986) and 
Simon and Francis (1988) documented evi-
dence that the Big-6 auditors obtained pre-
mium brand name on the free audit provides 
a higher quality audit. Yet, Craswell et al. 
(1995) stated that there was a specific indus-
try premium, above the general brand name 
premium on audit fees generated by the in-
dustrial specialization of the Firm. 
As based on the literature on previous 
research, it can be argued that both the size 
of the auditor (KAP), tenor auditor and 
auditor industry specialization are related to 
audit quality. Thus, it can also be argued 
that the third variable is a proxy of the in-
formation content of audit quality (reflect-
ing the role of information). Bond rating 
agencies, as information intermediaries, 
provides an independent assessment of the 
quality of the audit firm. Bond ratings 
should include information on the charac-
teristics of the quality of the content of the 
auditor, because the agency has an access to 
insider information and knowledge about 
the characteristics of quality auditors. If the 
information content of auditor quality char-
acteristics covers bond ratings, the size, 
auditor industry specialization tenor, this 
will have a significant effect on bond rat-
ings. 
Based on the crucial phenomenon 
above, the researchers find it important to do 
research related to the growth of the bond 
market which has increased from year to 
year. This phenomenon indicates that the 
bond market will show interesting trends in 
the coming years. For example, during the 
first semester of 2010, rupiah government 
bonds have recorded strong growth which 
increases by 44.1% per year. It is considered 
higher than the growth in 2009 at 37.6% per 
year (DGAT 2010). It could not be separated 
from economic conditions both globally and 
domestically.  
Based on the observation by the re-
searchers, the global economy has showed 
indications such as, i) improvement in the 
global economic outlook which prompted 
investors to invest their funds back to the 
capital market assets. ii) Increased risk in-
tention, buoyed by interest rate which is con-
trolled and maintained low, make a request 
(demand) of bonds increase, continue the 
increased trend from year to year. iii) The 
price of bonds has strengthened, especially 
in Emerging Market countries. The above 
condition is conducive due to the fact that 
the issuer tries to raise funds from the mar-
ket. iv), the condition of the world economy 
indicates favorable conditions for investors 
to invest in the bond market. However, until 
now there has been no research in Indonesia, 
which investigates how the characteristics of 
quality auditors are measured by size, audi-
tor specialization tenor, and affect corporate 
bond ratings. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS  
In this case, there are four important aspects 
such as signaling theory, agency theory, con-
tracting theory, and Quality Audit. The issu-
ance of corporate bond ratings could be ex-
plained either by signaling theory and 
agency theory or the theory of contract. Ac-
cording to Wolk et al. (2001) signaling the-
ory explains why the company can present 
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information to the capital markets.  
The above argument is due to the ability 
of this theory in providing signals to the us-
ers of financial statements. This signal is in 
the form of information about what has been 
done by the management to realize the wish 
of the owner. The signal can be either pro-
motion or other information that companies 
are better than other companies. Signaling 
theory explains that signaling by managers 
to reduce information asymmetry. By hiring 
an auditor to verify the financial statements, 
the manager gave a positive signal for the 
user. 
However, the quality of investor in mak-
ing decisions are influenced by the quality of 
information disclosed in the company's fi-
nancial statements. The quality of informa-
tion is aimed at reducing the information 
asymmetry that arises when managers are 
more aware of internal information and fu-
ture prospects of the company than the com-
pany externally. The information for the 
provision of corporate bond ratings is ex-
pected to be published on the company's 
financial condition concerning a specific 
signal that illustrates the possibilities that 
occur related to the debt incurred. 
The established agency theory is as an at-
tempt to understand and solve problems that 
arise when there is incomplete information at 
the time of the contract between the principal 
(the employer, such as shareholders, or man-
agement companies) and the agents (receiver 
commands, such as management or subordi-
nate). This theory was formerly pioneered by 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), which investi-
gated the relationship between the owner of 
the management framework and the agency 
relationship. In an agency relationship, there 
was a contract between the parties, owners, 
and other parties.  
Under the contract, the agent is bound to 
do some service for the owner based on the 
delegation of authority from the owner to the 
agent. Thus, they have to make business de-
cisions for the benefit of the owners. Be-
cause the interests of both parties are not 
always consistent, so often there is a clash of 
interest between owners (principals) are en-
trusted with the task of managing the firm 
(agent). 
In the context of the agency, both the 
principal and the agent are viewed as ra-
tional economic actors who act solely for 
personal interest. In practice, managers do 
not always act in accordance with the wishes 
of the owners (shareholders). This is due to 
the existence of moral hazard, for example 
the desired action by the managers when 
acting for personal gains, and ignores the 
interests of shareholders. For that reason, it 
is not in accordance with the contract 
agency. The condition is due to an informa-
tion asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. As such, they are more con-
cerned with the interests of managers. 
Agency theory should predict that, if the 
agent has information advantage over the 
principal and they have different interests 
with the principal, there will be a principal-
agent problem where the agent will perform 
actions that benefit themselves but harm the 
principal. 
The burden related to expenses is de-
rived from the management actions to 
agency costs (agency costs). In the context 
of the agency, it takes an independent third 
party, a mediator between the principal and 
the agent. Such third parties serve as agents 
to monitor the behavior of managers and 
ensure that the agent is acting in the interests 
of the principal. In this case, auditors are 
considered the party who is able to bridge 
the interests of the principals (shareholders) 
and agents (managers) to manage the com-
pany's finances.  
In turn, auditors perform monitoring 
functions to supervise the work of managers 
through the financial statements made by 
managers as part of the manager form of 
accountability to shareholders. According to 
the agency theory, it is stated that the figures 
in the financial statements was instrumental 
in the formation of the contract and monitor-
ing. The figures are often used to make ac-
counting contracts, such as debt contracts, 
compensation plans, bonus plans, and others.  
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The above contracts often include cer-
tain restrictions that must be accompanied 
by the parties involved in the contract. For 
that reason, there is a demand to perform 
calculations and reporting those numbers. 
Auditor role here is to report the debt con-
tract breach committed by certain parties as 
a breach of contract by the debtor's debts 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986). The auditor 
in this regard is expected to give an inde-
pendent view on the reasonableness of the 
figures presented by management. They 
should perform their function properly so 
that they can show their high competence 
and independence. 
 
Rating, Bond Risk, and Audit Quality 
It has been noted that bond is one of the 
sources of financing for the government and 
the company, in which this finance is ob-
tained from the capital market. Bonds are 
debt securities issued by a party (the issuer) 
with a specific repayment period (over one 
year), accompanied by a written promise, in 
the period or interval of time and its interest 
is paid in a coupon to the bondholders. In the 
maturity, principal money will also be paid 
to the bond holders concerned. Thus, bonds 
are a subset of the securities.  
Another one is effect that is a security, 
which may include debt instruments, com-
mercial paper, stocks, bonds, evidence of 
debt, units of collective investment con-
tracts, futures contracts on securities, and 
any derivatives of securities (Chapter 1, Ar-
ticle 1, Number 5 in Presiden Republik In-
donesia 1995). Before an issuer issues a 
bond, they must first do the test on the bonds 
by Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the rank test (rating) of bonds by the 
relevant institutions. Usually the whole pub-
lishing process takes about 3-6 months be-
fore the bonds can be issued and otherwise 
can be bought by investors (Indonesia Bond 
Pricing Agency 2010). Investor to invest in 
bonds will be faced with the risk of the fol-
lowing: 1) default risk, the risk of unpaid 
interest and nominal bonds, 2) liquidity risk, 
i.e. the risk of difficult to sell the bonds 
back. 3) Interest rate risk, the risk of price 
falls due to rising interest rates. 
Bonds are usually ranked by the rating 
agencies regularly. The agency helps inves-
tors in providing information regarding the 
economic viability of investment and finan-
cial issuer of the bonds. Bonds are rated 
agencies that provide an overview of credi-
bility (credit worthiness) and affect the sale 
of bonds (Fabozzi 2000). Thus, it can be 
used to assist prospective investors in bonds 
to measure the risk of default (default risk). 
The higher the bond rating, then it shows a 
high bond issuers ability to pay its debts 
(IBPA 2010). 
In Indonesia, there are some studies re-
lated to the factors that affect bond ratings 
such as by Andry (2005), Almilia and Devi, 
(2007), Manurung et al. (2009) and Yuliana 
et al. (2011). For example, Andry (2005) 
investigates the factors of accounting and 
non-accounting, the growth, size, sinking 
fund, maturity, security and reputation of the 
auditor, found that the age of the bonds (ma-
turity) and the auditor's reputation has influ-
ence in predicting bond ratings. 
Manurung et al. (2009), uses financial 
ratios as Current Ratio (CR), Total Asset 
Turnover (TAT), Net Profit Margin (NPM), 
Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets 
(ROA), Debt to Equity Ratio (DER) and 
Beta (systematic risk) and the samples used 
were 108 companies rated by PEFINDO 
2007. They found empirical evidence that 
the fundamental variables affect bond rat-
ings. These variables are Current Ratio 
(CR), Total Asset Turnover (TAT), and Re-
turn on Assets (ROA). 
Another proponent is Yuliana et al. 
(2011) investigating the factors such as ac-
counting: firm size, leverage, profitability, 
activity, market value ratio, and non-
accounting: factors such as age bond, guar-
antee (secure), as well as the reputation of 
the auditor, found that the size, profitabil-
ity, secure and reputable auditor affect bond 
ratings on the company's financial predic-
tions. 
Bond ratings by agencies are compiled 
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using the latest information they can get 
about the company and their future prospects 
and the required interest payment schedule. 
There is an important component used by 
the agency in making the decision. It is the 
company's financial statement which has 
been audited (Standard & Poor's, S & P Rat-
ing Group 2003). The theory and accounting 
literature suggest that factors related to the 
quality of the audit will affect the perception 
of market participants over financial report-
ing information (De Angelo 1981; Balvers et 
al. 1988; Beatty 1989; Menon and Williams 
1991; Teoh and Wong 1993; Michaely and 
Shaw 1995; Muzatko et al. 2004). In addi-
tion, the level of audit quality or confidence 
shown by the auditor is directly influenced 
by the perceived level of independence 
shown by the auditor (De Angelo 1981, 
Johnstone et al. 2001). 
Allen (1994), for example, tested the 
agency's perception of the benefits of ac-
counting information, which is done by test-
ing the relationship between accounting in-
formation and bond rating. He argues that 
the financial information users perceive that 
Big 8 auditors provide better quality audits 
for companies and local government.. The 
empirical analysis supports their hypothesis 
that the Big 8 audit accounting information 
is related to the ability to predict accurately 
the decision of the local government bond 
ratings. The results of the analysis indicate 
that there was the weak bond issuers, yet 
they were backed up by a large public ac-
countant offices or KAP (Big 8) that get a 
higher rating. 
Bond rating agencies, as information 
intermediaries, provide an independent as-
sessment of the credit quality of the com-
pany. They should include information on 
the characteristics of the quality of the con-
tent of the auditor, because the agency can 
have access to insider information and 
knowledge about the characteristics of qual-
ity auditors. Therefore, when the informa-
tion content of auditor quality characteris-
tics cover bond ratings, the size, auditor 
industry specialization tenor, and auditors, 
it will significantly influence bond ratings. 
From the description above, the first hy-
pothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H1: Auditor size positively effects on bond 
rating 
The increase of tenor auditors expresses 
the fact of having positive or negative im-
pact on audit quality, especially the effect 
on the perception of independence. The ar-
guments supporting this opinion states that 
the increased tenor auditor negatively ef-
fects auditor independence. This in turn will 
result in a decline, and will reduce the qual-
ity and increase the risk of corporate audit. 
This evidence is consistent with a lower 
bond rating. Instead, to support that in-
creased tenor auditor independence was not 
significantly reduced, it leads to higher au-
dit quality because they have a better un-
derstanding about the condition of the com-
pany. Thus, they reduce the risk of actual or 
perception companies (De Crabtree et al. 
2006). 
De Crabtree et al. (2006) specifically 
tested the effect on the perception of auditor 
on the tenor auditors’ independency by bond 
rating agencies. The sample used is the latest 
bonds (newly) issued during the year 1992-
2002. They found that tenor auditors are 
positively related to bond rating they re-
ceived. This evidence is still consistent for 
all samples cover investment grade, corpo-
rate performance, and time periods. They 
found no evidence that the longer the audi-
tor-client relationship tend to increase the 
perception of audit quality. 
In connection with the above evidence, 
De Crabtree et al. (2006) stated that the 
bond rating reflects the rating agency per-
ceptions of the examination of financial 
statements by auditors. Their findings sup-
ported this issue. The higher the perceived 
quality of financial reporting, ceteris pari-
bus, the more they lead to the higher bond 
rating companies. Zeibert and Reiter (1992) 
as quoted by De Crabtree et al. (2006) 
stated that the rating that has been assigned 
to the debt is a significant determinant of 
the yield of the principal to be paid by the 
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company. The higher the rating indicates 
less risk of failure and this is also consistent 
with the effective interest rate reductions 
made by the company. From the description 
above, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Auditor tenor positively affects bond 
rating 
The next is on industry specialist audi-
tor. In this case, Lou and Vasvari (2009) 
had investigated the relationship between 
auditor specialization and the cost of pub-
lic debt. They claim that knowledge spe-
cific to the industry, possessed by special-
ists tend to increase the accuracy and qual-
ity of audited financial statements. The 
researcher expect that lenders less protect 
the price when auditors significantly con-
tribute to reducing information asymme-
tries associated with the borrower's finan-
cial position.  
By using a large sample of the 10,276 
from the issuance of bonds in the U.S. be-
tween the years 1995 to 2001 and measure 
the industry specialist auditors, with a 10% 
market share of top clients, it was found evi-
dence that the rating agencies and bond in-
vestors assess the benefits of the industry 
specialist auditors. Specifically, the re-
searchers found that the bond company uses 
industry specialist auditors (IAS) to obtain 
better ratings that indicate credit quality as-
sessment by rating agencies than corporate 
bonds that do not use the industry specialist 
auditors (ISA). Based on this argument, the 
third hypothesis is:  
H3: industry specialist auditors positively 
affect bond rating. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data and Sample 
The data is financial data, including audited 
financial statements and the nominal value 
of the bonds, as well as non-financial data 
on the company's choice of auditor, issue 
date (settlement) bond, due dates and bond 
rating. Sources of data of the audited finan-
cial statements and bond price data were 
taken from the Indonesia Stock Exchange, 
the Indonesian Capital Market Directory, 
Reference Center Market Model, the Indo-
nesia Stock Exchange, and the Data Center 
Business of Faculty of Economics and Busi-
ness Gadjah Mada University.  
The data related to bond rating and cor-
porate bonds were obtained from PT Pemer-
ingkat Securities Indonesia (PEFINDO = 
company whose job is rating the securities), 
PT Indonesian Central Securities Depository 
(KSEI) and Indonesia Bond Pricing Agency 
(IBPA). The population consists of all the 
companies that issued the bonds, in the re-
search period of 2000-2010. Sampling is 
purposive sampling method, as based on the 
criteria such as they should have: a) infor-
mation on the selection of auditors (auditor 
choice) from the years 2000-2010, b) au-
dited financial statements in a row between 
the years of 2000-2010, c) data available for 
a complete bond of the years 2000-2010, 
including the settlement date, maturity date, 
face value, and the rating. 
 
Description of the Sample 
The sample was selected through observation 
with 1283 observations as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1  
Sample Characteristics 
 
Total of companies’ bonds listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (ISE) 2000-2010 555 series 
Total of the companies with complete data 383 series 
Total of the sample observed from 2000 to 2010 1283 
Total of observed sample using big auditors (Big-4) 834 
Total of observed sample using medium auditors 288 
Total of sample using small auditors 161 
 1283 
Total of the observed sample using industry specialist auditors 354 
Total of the observed sample not using industry specialist auditors 929 
 1283 
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Research Variables 
It consists of dependent variable, including 
credit rating (bond ratings), the independent 
variables such as the size, tenor and industry 
specialist auditors; controlled variables con-
trol, based on the variables in previous 
which studies (Mansi et al. 2004 and Lou 
and Vasvari 2009) which are known to af-
fect bond ratings include: (1) the company's 
risk factors: firm size, leverage, profitability, 
coverage, age of firm, (2) factors securities 
risk factors: age bonds (maturity), bond size, 
duration, and bank debt. 
 
Operational Definition and Variable 
Measurement  
The operation and variable measurement are 
such as Quality Auditor consisting of (1) the 
competence of the auditor, the auditor's abil-
ity to detect material errors or misstatements 
in the client's financial statements, and (2) 
the independence of the auditor, the auditor 
tendency to correct material errors (De An-
gelo 1981). 
 
The Auditor Size 
De Angelo (1981) stated that the quality of 
audit independence is defined as high as 
possible factors the auditor can find and re-
port violations of the client's accounting sys-
tem. In this case, discovery violation is a 
measure of the quality of audits related to 
knowledge, experience, and ability to audi-
tors. Therefore, the quality of the audit can 
be proxied by auditor size. 
 This study uses Big 4 auditors for audi-
tor large proxy and Non-Big 4 auditors for 
proxy small. Auditor size is measured by 
binary variables, 1 is for companies that use 
large auditor (Big 4) and 0 for firms that use 
smaller auditors (Non-Big 4). The auditor 
tenor is the length of time related to the rela-
tionship between the auditor and the client. 
Auditor tenor is measured by the length of 
time since the auditor who first got the as-
signment for a particular client. For the pub-
lic accountant offices (PAOs) with foreign 
companies in case of change of local part-
ners, while its affiliates have not changed, 
they are considered to have fixed tenor. The 
auditor is the industry specialist auditor with 
knowledge and skills related to the financial 
statements on a particular industry and can 
provide a better audit quality.  
According to Lou and Vasvari (2009) 
industry specialist auditors are the auditors 
or PAOs with the highest market share in an 
industry. Auditor market share in an industry 
is the number of clients divided by the total 
sales volume of sales in an industry, which 
can be formulated as follows (Lou and Vas-
vari 2009; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). 
∑∑
∑
= K
k
I
i
ijk
I
i
ijk
jk
Sales
Sales
eMarketShar . (1) 
Note: 
i  = index of client company 
k = index of auditors 
j  = index of industry. 
The above measurement is said to have 
an aggregate level due to the importance of 
the clients. This then represents whether the 
skills of auditors are admitted in an industry 
(Lou and Vasvari 2009; Mayhew and Wil-
kins 2003). From the above size, it is re-
ferred to as industry specialist auditors (ISA) 
when the client has a market share of 15% of 
the highest in the industry. Furthermore, the 
industry specialist auditors were measured 
by a dummy variable, 1 if the company uses 
industry specialist auditor and 0 otherwise. 
 
The Role of Information  
This variable refers to the main purpose of 
the audit which is to reduce the information 
asymmetry between stakeholders and com-
pany management. Wallace (1987) states 
that the audit process will add value of the 
accounting information, thereby improving 
the quality of financial information. The 
higher the quality (credibility) audits, the 
financial reports will improve reliability and 
reduce investor risk (Brown et al. 2008). 
 
Bond Ratings 
Bond rating is the main indicator of the risk, 
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which is published by agencies. The rating 
provides an indication of the possibility of 
regaining investor investment's sake, but 
with no specific predictions on the probabil-
ity of default. The higher the rank of a bond, 
the more likely the bond in the future fails to 
meet their obligations. For Indonesia domes-
tic agencies, they have been granted permis-
sion from Bapepam-LK that is PEFINDO, 
Fitch Indonesia, and Moody's Indonesia. 
The researchers use data of bond ratings 
from PEFINDO, with measurements as fol-
lows: : idAAA: 20, idAAA-: 19; idAA+: 18; 
idAA:17; idAA-:16; idA+:15; idA: 14; idA-
:13; idBBB+:12; idBBB: 11; idBBB-: 10; 
idBB+: 9; idBB: 8; idBB-:7; idB+:6; idB:5; 
idB-:4; idCCC+: 3; idCCC: 2; idD: 1. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The testing of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 was 
conducted by means of the regression on 
auditor size, tenor, industry specialist audi-
tors, and other controlled variables on the 
credit rating. The steps of the analysis and the 
model which is drawn in the research built 
Mansi et al. (2004) by adding the industry 
specialist auditors (ISA) as independent vari-
ables and the controlled variable of maturity 
(tenor) and the bond size as follows: 
CreditRating = α0 + α1 AS + α2 T + α3 ISA 
+ β1…n FCR + γ1…n FSR. (2) 
Note: 
AS : Auditor Size 
T : Tenor 
ISA : Industry Specialist Auditor 
FCR : Factors of company risk 
FSR : Factors of security risk. 
The controlled variables are based on re-
search studies conducted by Mansi et al. 
2004 and Lou and Vasvari (2009) such as: 
the company's risk factors, namely firm size, 
leverage, profitability, coverage, age of the 
company. These risk factors are maturity 
securities (tenor), the bond size, duration’ 
and bank debt. 
Credit rating institutions, as information 
intermediaries, provide an independent as-
sessment of the credit quality of the com-
pany. Credit rating should include informa-
tion on the characteristics of the content of 
the auditor in the bond rating, because rating 
agencies have access to insider information 
and knowledge about the characteristics of 
quality auditors.  
Therefore, when the information content 
of auditor quality characteristics covered 
bond ratings, the size of the auditor, auditor 
tenor, and industry specialist auditor can 
have a significant effect on bond ratings. 
This could mean that the bond rating cap-
tures the role of information auditor charac-
teristics. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics of Research Vari-
ables 
As presented in Table 2, the average value 
of bond ratings is 14.321, indicating that the 
average bond rating is at A and A-. This 
means that the average rating of the bonds at 
the time of emission shows well worth for 
the investment. In addition, the average size 
of the auditor is 0.667 meaning that more 
companies are using big auditors (Big-4) 
compared to those using small auditors (non 
Big-4). Average auditor tenor is 2.922, 
which means that the auditor engagements 
with clients between 2-3 years. On the con-
trary, the average company using industry 
specialist auditor is 0.436. This indicates that 
companies using industry specialist auditors 
are less than those which do not use the in-
dustry specialist auditor. 
 
Results of the Hypothesis Testing 
The results can be seen in Table 3, in which 
it provides the analysis as based on Mansi et 
al. (2004) as shown in the formula 2. Table 3 
shows that the coefficient on auditor size is 
positive that is 0557 (t-statistic 2.824) and it 
is significant at α 1%, which means that the 
higher the size of the auditor, the higher 
bond ratings. Therefore, hypothesis one (H1) 
which states that there is positive effect 
auditor size on bond rating is proved. It can 
be interpreted that bond rating captures the 
role of the information contained in the audi-
tor size. 
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The above evidence is consistent with 
Allen (1984) who argues that a weak bond 
issuers but backed by the Firm will receive a 
higher rating. This argument is also consis-
tent with Mansi et al. (2004) which states 
that companies that use small auditors (Non-
Big 6) will reduce the score rating of one 
level (e.g. small companies with auditor ob-
tain BBB rating, while the same company, 
with a large auditor ( Big 6) will get a rating 
BBB +). This is especially contradictory 
with the statements by Simunic (2003) that 
the size of audit quality is by just basing on 
the size of the Firm should be investigated 
again. 
The direction of tenor variable coeffi-
cient is positive that is 0.023 (t-statistic 
0.591) but not significant, which means that 
the hypothesis two (H2) stating that the 
auditor tenor has a positive effect on bond 
rating is not supported. This evidence does 
not support government regulations on audi-
tor rotation duty.  
The regulations on Firm rotation and AP 
obligations in Indonesia is based on the De-
cree of the Minister of Finance of the Re-
public of Indonesia (KMK-RI) No. 
423/KMK.06/2002 on Public Accountant 
Services, Article 6 paragraph 4, which reads: 
"Provision of services of general audit of the 
financial statements of an entity can be by 
public accountant offices (KAP) which is at 
the longest up to 5 years continuously fiscal 
years and by a public accountant (AP) at the 
latest for 3 years continuously fiscal years.” 
The next is that the provision for rota-
tion of KAP and the last AP, Finance Minis-
ter Regulation (PMK), the PMK No: 
17/PMK.01/2008, chapter 3, for KAP is 6 
years and 3 years for the public accountant 
(AP). The increase of auditor has a positive 
or negative impact on audit quality, espe-
cially the effect on the perception of inde-
pendence. It supports the claim that the 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables 
 
Variables*  Mean 
Credit Rating 14.321 
Auditor Size  0.667 
Tenure  2.922 
IAS  0.436 
Firm Size 29.444 
Leverage  0.689 
Profit  0.069 
Coverage  1.453 
Firm Age  3.117 
Tenor  2.982 
Bond Size 26.083 
Duration  0.084 
Bank Debt  0.777 
CredRating = Bond rating, measured by: idAAA=20; idD=1. 
AuditorSize = Auditor size, measured by 1= big (Big-4) 0-= small (Non Big-4) 
Tenure = Auditor tenor, measured by the length of auditor assignment on an entity. 
IAS = Industry specialist auditor, measured by 1= auditor with industry specialist 0 = auditor with 
no industry specialist 
FirmSize = Company age, measured by natural logarithm of total asset 
Leverage = Ratio of company leverage 
Profit = Ratio of company probability 
Coverage = Ratio of company coverage 
Firm Age = Company age, measured by natural logarithm since the company established 
Tenor = duration, measured by modified duration. 
Bond Size = Bond size, measured by natural logarithm natural of bond nominal value. 
Bank Debt = Bank debt measured by 1= company with bank debt 0 = company with no bank debt 
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negative effect of increased auditor tenor 
will result in auditor independence, and will 
reduce the quality. The increase of the risk 
of company auditors is consistent with a 
lower bond rating.  
Instead, to support that increased auditor 
tenor, makes independence not significantly 
reduced, and leads to higher audit quality 
because they have a better understanding 
about the condition of the company, so as to 
reduce the risk of actual or perception of 
companies (De Crabtree et al. 2006). The 
above results support the positive impact on 
the quality of audit tenor, as practiced by 
Solomon et al. (1999), stating that the longer 
auditor tenor will reduce the information 
asymmetry between the auditor and the cli-
ent. In that case, they can lead a better qual-
ity of audit.  
Ebrahim (2001) states that the auditor 
tenor has a positive effect on the efficiency 
of the audit process and enhance the moni-
toring functions. This is assumed by the 
auditor. Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) 
found that the asymmetry of information 
between the auditor and client is high in the 
first year of assignment. Ghosh and Moon 
(2002), Johnson et al. (2002); Myers et al. 
(2003) found that if tenor auditor increases 
the earnings management through discre-
tionary accruals and certain items decreased.  
Carcello and Nagy (2004) argue that fi-
nancial fraud occurs when the auditor tenor 
is less or 3 years. Carey and Simnett (2006) 
found consistent evidence that audit quality 
associated with long tenor audit partner. De 
Crabtree et al. (2006) specifically investigate 
the effect of the perception of auditor tenor 
Table 3 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Independent and Controlled Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.001   -0.008  
Auditor Size 0.557***   2.824  
Tenor 0.023   0.591  
ISA 0.544***   2.759  
Firm Size 0.455***   6.566  
Leverage -0.185   -1.248  
Profit 3.088***   5.132  
Coverage 0.088**   2.500  
Firm Age -0.489**   -2.278  
Tenor -0.120***   -4.225  
Bond Size 0.304***   3.398  
Duration -0.188   -0.423  
Bank Debt -0.338**   -1.998  
N 1283  
R2 12.10%  
 ***= significant at α 1%; **= significant at α 5%;*= significant at α 10% 
CredRating = Bond rating, measured by: idAAA=20; idD=1. 
AuditorSize = Auditor size, measured by 1= big (Big-4) 0-= small (Non Big-4) 
Tenure = Auditor tenor, measured by the length of auditor assignment on an entity. 
IAS = Industry specialist auditor, measured by 1= auditor with industry specialist 0 = auditor with 
no industry specialist 
FirmSize = Company age, measured by natural logarithm of total asset 
Leverage = Ratio of company leverage 
Profit = Ratio of company probability 
Coverage = Ratio of company coverage 
Firm Age = Company age, measured by natural logarithm since the company established 
Tenor = duration, measured by modified duration. 
Bond Size = Bond size, measured by natural logarithm natural of bond nominal value. 
Bank Debt = Bank debt measured by 1= company with bank debt 0 = company with no bank debt 
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on auditor independence by bond rating 
agencies. They found that auditor tenor is 
positively related to bond rating they re-
ceived, and the finding is consistent for all 
samples that are investment grade, corporate 
performance, and time periods. They found 
no evidence that the longer the auditor-client 
relationship will decrease the perception of 
audit quality. 
Variables of industry specialist auditor 
(ISA) is measured using a market share of 
15% showing a positive coefficient of 0544 
with t-count α 2.759 and significant at 1%. 
Thus, the third hypothesis (H3) stating that 
industry specialist auditor has positive effect 
on bond rating is supported. These results 
can be interpreted that the bond ratings cap-
ture the role of the information contained in 
industry specialist auditor. 
The results of testing three hypotheses 
specifically are consistent with Lou and 
Vasvari (2009) who also investigated the 
relationship between specialization of audi-
tor and the cost of public debt. It was found 
that companies using industry specialist 
auditors (ISA) receive better ratings and pay 
a lower yield when publishing bond securi-
ties.  
The implication of such evidence can be 
drawn from the results that rating agencies 
assess the benefits of industry specialist 
auditors. Hypothesis 3 also supports the re-
search in general by Solomon et al. (1999) 
and Hogan and Jeter (1999). It is argued that 
those auditors who specialize in a particular 
industry are generally associated with higher 
audit quality (auditor expertise supporting 
hypothesis). Dunn and Mayhew (2004) 
found that industry specialization associated 
with better corporate disclosure, as measured 
by the evaluation of the quality of disclosure 
by analysts.  
Research by Palmrose (1991), Simon 
and Francis (1988) documented evidence 
that the Big-6 auditor obtaining premium 
brand name in the audit fee to provide higher 
audit quality, while Craswell et al. (1995) 
stated that the industry specific premium is 
above the general brand name premium on 
audit fees which is generated by the indus-
trial specialization of the Firm. Carcello and 
Nagy (2009) investigated relationship be-
tween industry specialist auditors and finan-
cial reporting fraudulent, providing strong 
support for a negative relationship between 
industry specialist auditors and financial re-
porting fraudulent by the client. 
In general, this study provides empirical 
evidence that companies using auditors who 
have industry specialization will gain better 
bond ratings. This is due to the fact that the 
auditors who have been specialized in indus-
tries will have a better understanding about 
the condition of the auditee in a particular 
industry. Understanding the benefit of audi-
tors in performing the audit, especially for 
detecting fraud in the financial statements 
may be made auditee. 
 
Results of Controlled Variables 
The controlled variables are the characteris-
tics of auditor (Auditor Size, Tenor, ISA. All 
these are measured using the company size, 
leverage, profitability, coverage, company 
age. The company's risk factors are maturity 
(tenor or time to maturity), bond size, dura-
tion, bank debt, and the security risk factors.  
The coefficient on the variable of com-
pany size indicates a positive direction 0.455 
with a t-statistic 6.566 and thus, it is highly 
significant. This result is consistent with the 
prediction that the larger size of the com-
pany will further improve bond ratings. The 
coefficient on the variable of leverage indi-
cating a negative leverage that is -0.185 with 
t-statistics -1.248. The higher the leverage 
ratio is, the lower the bond rating of the 
companies. 
The coefficient on the profitability indi-
cates a positive direction 3.088 with a t-
statistic 5.132 and thus it is highly signifi-
cant. The higher the company's ability to 
generate profit is, the higher the bond rating. 
The coefficient of coverage also indi-
cates a positive direction 0.088 with a t-
statistic 2,500 and this is also significant at α 
5%, which means that the larger the com-
pany coverage is the bigger the bond rating. 
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The variable of company tenor or company 
age is -0.489 indicating a negative direction 
with t-statistic -2.278 and it is significant at 
α 5%, thus the company's age is a crucial 
factor that must be taken into account for 
bond rating improvement. The longer the 
life of the company is, the bigger the bond 
rating. The variable of maturity (tenor) 
shows a negative direction α -0.116 and sig-
nificant at 1%. Thus, the maturity of the 
bonds is a factor which must be taken into 
account in formulating corporate bond rat-
ings. The longer the maturity of the bonds is, 
the lower the ranking. 
Now is the bond size bond in which it 
shows a positive direction 0.304 (t-statistic 
3.398) and significant at α 1%, which means 
that the greater the size of the bond is the 
greater the bond ratings. The coefficient of 
the duration shows a negative direction -
0.188 with the t-statistic -0.423 and this is 
not significant. It can be stated that the 
greater the duration of the bond is, the lower 
the rating. This is due to the fact that the 
greater duration of the bond also shows 
greater volatility of bond price. As such, it 
causes the greater risk. However, the vari-
able of the length is not a factor that needs to 
be taken into account in determining bond 
ratings. Last but not least, it is the security 
risk, which is also consistent with the predic-
tions for the variable of bank debt, which 
shows a negative and highly significant at -
0.347. The higher the firm's debt is, the 
lower the bond ratings. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
Some generalizations can be drawn as the 
following. It is obvious that auditors should 
play an important role in the capital market, 
because they can provide an independent 
verification of the financial statements pro-
vided by the manager. In such a condition, 
the quality of auditors contributed to the 
credibility of financial statement disclosures. 
Through its role as a provider of the infor-
mation which is expected to have character-
istics of quality the auditors, they can benefit 
from the capital market. 
It also provides evidence that the charac-
teristics of the size and quality of industry 
specialist auditor have a positive effect on 
bond ratings. This reflects that the bond rat-
ings capture the role of the information con-
tained in the auditor quality characteristics, 
auditor size, and industry specialist auditors. 
In addition, the size of the auditor and the 
industry specialist auditor are the factors that 
must be taken into account by the rating 
agencies in setting bond ratings.  
The rating agencies assess that bond is-
suers by using big auditors and specialists in 
certain industries, which show audit assur-
ance to improve audit quality to become a 
high rank. In general, this study provides 
empirical evidence that the quality charac-
teristics of the auditor, the auditor size, and 
industry specialist auditor are the important 
factors for the stock market in Indonesia, 
especially the rating agencies.  
The auditor tenor is having coefficient is 
directly to support the positive influence on 
the independence, meaning that in the long, 
tenor has no impact on the independence, 
and lead to higher audit quality because they 
have a better understanding about the condi-
tion of the company, so as to reduce the risk 
of actual or company perception. Due to 
this, the result was not significant, which 
cannot be related to government regulations 
and public accountant offices (KAP AP) 
rotation, the Finance Minister Regulation 
(PMK), the PMK No; 17/PMK.01/2008, 
chapter 3, for KAP is 6 years and 3 years for 
the AP. 
Some limitations may also affect the in-
terpretation of the results, namely: 1) it does 
not separate the non-financial industries and 
the financial and banking industry that have 
different regulations. 2) it does not consider 
the size of a medium auditor, so the auditor 
grouping into large and small, perhaps too 
confounding with medium auditor. 3) This 
study measures the industry specialist audi-
tors approach to market share. 
The next research should address such 
limitations above such as by separating the 
ISSN 2087-3735 The Effect of Auditor … (Sri Wahyuni) 
184 
financial and non-financial industries, classi-
fying auditor size into large, medium, and 
small and measure industry specialist audi-
tors and a portfolio approach (portfolio ap-
proach) to make it more relevant. 
This study provides policy implications, 
especially for the Indonesian Institute of Ac-
countants, which is the basis for evaluating 
the rotation policy input for public account-
ant offices (KAP and AP), with a glance at 
their effectiveness, because the results of 
this study indicate that the rating agencies 
did not review the auditor tenor as a basis 
for the preparation of bond ratings. The 
practical implication of the research for the 
company issuing the bond is by using the 
auditor and the industry specialist auditor to 
increase bond ratings. 
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